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GOVERNING EXTINCTION IN THE ERA OF 
GENE EDITING* 
JONAS J. MONAST** 
CRISPR-Cas9 genome-editing technology (“CRISPR”) offers a 
potential solution for some of the world’s critical conservation 
challenges. Scientists are harnessing CRISPR to expand genetic 
diversity of endangered species, control invasive species, or 
enhance species’ resiliency to a changing climate. Recreating 
extinct species is now realistic, as is engineering entirely new 
species. CRISPR also creates opportunities to address vector-
borne infectious diseases such as malaria, dengue fever, and Zika 
using gene drive techniques that can spread genetic alterations 
through populations. 
While CRISPR is a powerful tool to address public health and 
conservation goals, it could allow scientists to bypass long-
standing value choices underlying national and international 
conservation efforts and foster permanent ecosystem impacts 
before public policy can react. This Article argues that, while 
current conservation laws do not directly address many of the 
specific questions that arise with CRISPR, the Endangered 
Species Act (“ESA”) establishes a framework that can, and 
should, guide the use of gene editing. The proposal calls for: (1) 
a presumption against the release of genetically modified 
organisms that could cause species extinction, (2) exemptions for 
specific public health and environmental goals, and (3) updates 
to the ESA to clarify oversight of gene editing. 
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The world is watching species go extinct in real time. The last 
male northern white rhino died in March 2018.1 In September of the 
same year, scientists discovered a new threat to the critically 
endangered Asiatic lion: canine distemper carried by ticks.2 Killer 
whales are at risk of extinction due to chemical pollution in oceans.3 
Invasive rodents threaten endangered island-dwelling bird species.4 
 
 1. Joshua Berlinger, World’s Last Northern White Rhino Dies, CNN (Mar. 20, 2018, 
12:41 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/20/africa/last-male-white-rhino-dies-intl/index.
html [https://perma.cc/CPX8-9WMN]; Torill Kornfeldt, Bring Back the Northern Rhino?, 
SLATE (Nov. 15, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2018/11/reorigin-of-species-
excerpt-cloning-northern-white-rhino-deextinction.html [https://perma.cc/2HVV-UNHP] 
(“[N]o more northern white rhinos will be born by natural means.”).  
 2. Stuart Winter, DEADLY Dog Diseases ‘Wiping OUT’ World’s Rarest Lions - 23 
Dead in THREE WEEKS, DAILY EXPRESS (Oct. 3, 2018, 15:00), https://www.express.co.uk/
news/nature/1026298/Lions-dying-deadly-pet-disease [https://perma.cc/D7QC-CHT6]. 
 3. “A Population Marching Toward Extinction”: Missing Orca Feared Dead, CBS 
NEWS (Sept. 14, 2018, 4:01 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/j50-missing-orca-declared-
dead-a-population-marching-toward-extinction-2018-09-14/ [https://perma.cc/SA6E-592T]. 
 4. Matt McGrath, ‘Super-Sized’ Mice Threaten Seabird Colonies with Extinction, 
BBC NEWS (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-45918770 
[https://perma.cc/4THL-7B6F]. 
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 CRISPR-Cas9 genome-editing technology (“CRISPR”) offers a 
potential solution for some of these critical conservation challenges.5 
Scientists are harnessing CRISPR to expand genetic diversity of 
endangered species, control invasive species, and enhance species’ 
resiliency to a changing climate. Recreating extinct species is now 
realistic, as is engineering entirely new species.6 CRISPR also creates 
opportunities to address vector-borne infectious diseases such as 
malaria, dengue fever, and Zika virus using gene drive techniques 
that can spread genetic alterations through populations.  
These genetic interventions, however, could foster population 
collapse before triggering the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”)—the 
cornerstone of U.S. legal efforts to prevent extinction.7 The statute 
presumes that extinction is gradual, permanent, and an outcome that 
humans should generally prevent.8 Advances in biotechnology 
challenge each of these conclusions and could circumvent the ESA’s 
role in species conservation.9 CRISPR, therefore, could allow 
scientists to bypass long-standing value choices underlying national 
and international conservation efforts and foster permanent 
ecosystem impacts before policymakers can react. 
With CRISPR, the critical question is no longer whether humans 
can alter genes to eradicate some species and make others resilient to 
factors that may cause extinction. Instead, the questions are whether 
we should and, if so, under what circumstances. While the potential 
benefits are profound, CRISPR could also foment similarly profound, 
and potentially irreversible, negative impacts for the target species 
 
 5. CRISPR, short for “clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats,” 
utilizes engineered RNA and proteins to edit specific sections of DNA. Questions and 
Answers about CRISPR, BROAD INST., https://www.broadinstitute.org/what-broad/areas-
focus/project-spotlight/questions-and-answers-about-crispr [https://perma.cc/Q8XQ-5E9M]. 
Scientists may use the process to remove targeted DNA or replace the original DNA with 
new DNA strands to create new traits. Id. For a more detailed description of CRISPR, see 
generally John M. Conley, Introduction: A Lawyer’s Guide to CRISPR, 97 N.C. L. REV. 
1040 (2019).  
 6. Kevin M. Esvelt et al., Emerging Technology: Concerning RNA-Guided Gene 
Drives for the Alteration of Wild Populations, 3 ELIFE, no. e03401, July 17, 2014, at 1, 2 
(“[S]everal published gene drive architectures could lead to extinction or other hazardous 
consequences if applied to sensitive species, demonstrating an urgent need for improved 
methods of controlling these elements.”); see also Amy Dockser Marcus, Meet the 
Scientists Bringing Extinct Species Back From the Dead, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 11, 2018, 6:27 
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/meet-the-scientists-bringing-extinct-species-back-from-
the-dead-1539093600 [https://perma.cc/B59C-V6AR (dark archive)]. 
 7. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§	1531–1544 (2012)).  
 8. See infra Section II.A. 
 9. See infra Section II.A. 
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and the broader ecosystems in which they exist.10 Existing laws are 
not designed to grapple with these important value choices. 
Gene editing raises many of the hallmark challenges with 
emerging technology governance.11 These recent advances in 
biotechnology may fall outside the scope of existing regulatory 
schemes designed for earlier understandings of technologies. They 
may also require responses by multiple agencies operating under 
different bodies of law.12 The pace of scientific developments is 
occurring much faster than traditional regulation can typically 
respond.13 There are calls for flexibility and adaptability to allow the 
technologies to evolve.14 Continued research is necessary to develop 
new, potentially beneficial uses for the technology, but the research 
also creates unknown risks. The technology is widely accessible, 
allowing individual research labs to create and release edited 
organisms with potentially wide-ranging impacts.15 Nonbinding soft 
 
 10. Charleston Noble et al., Current CRISPR Gene Drive Systems Are Likely to Be 
Highly Invasive in Wild Populations, 7 ELIFE, no. e33423, June 19, 2018, at 1, 1. 
 11. COMM. ON GENE DRIVE RESEARCH IN NON-HUMAN ORGANISMS: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESPONSIBLE CONDUCT, NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G, & 
MED., GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON: ADVANCING SCIENCE, NAVIGATING 
UNCERTAINTY, AND ALIGNING RESEARCH WITH PUBLIC VALUES 149 (2016) 
[hereinafter GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON] (“[D]ifficult questions of [gene drive] 
governance [arise], e.g., who should make decisions, who should be consulted, who is 
accountable to whom, and how liability should be handled as a legal matter.”). 
 12. See, e.g., Igor Linkov et al., Comparative, Collaborative, and Integrative Risk 
Governance for Emerging Technologies, 38 ENV’T SYSTEMS & DECISIONS 170, 171 (2018) 
(“[A]n innovation often challenges several policy areas that are used to operating in silos, 
whereas innovation may require more flexible, adaptive, and integrated approaches.”); 
Gregory N. Mandel & Gary E. Marchant, The Living Regulatory Challenges of Synthetic 
Biology, 100 IOWA L. REV. 155, 162 (2014) (“Regulatory systems, almost always, are 
designed for technologies existing at the time of the regulatory systems’ formation and are 
based on the then-current understanding of that technology. Such systems often face 
difficulty and disruption when applied to newly emerging technologies.”). 
 13. Rachel Wynberg & Sarah A. Laird, Fast Science and Sluggish Policy: The 
Herculean Task of Regulating Biodiscovery, 36 TRENDS BIOTECHNOLOGY 1, 1 (2018). 
The Convention on Biological Diversity has only recently settled on a definition for 
synthetic biology and is still assessing how the convention applies to gene editing. 
Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Synthetic Biology, 
¶	4, CBD/COP/DEC/XIII/17 (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-
13/cop-13-dec-17-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/TCL7-LGD4] (defining synthetic biology as “a 
further development and new dimension of modern biotechnology that combines science, 
technology and engineering to facilitate and accelerate the understanding, design, 
redesign, manufacture and/or modification of genetic materials, living organisms and 
biological systems”).  
 14. See, e.g., Linkov et al., supra note 12, at 171. 
 15. See, e.g., Brooke Borel & Quanta, When Evolution Fights Back Against Genetic 
Engineering, ATLANTIC (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/
2016/09/gene-drives/499574/ [https://perma.cc/7J8T-KCYS] (noting that scientists can now 
“order the essential biological tools on the internet and build a working gene drive in mere 
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law measures, such as professional standards and codes of conduct, 
will play important roles in overseeing research and development of 
CRISPR-edited organisms. Gene editing implicates diverse and deep-
seated values, but engaging a broad range of stakeholders is difficult. 
Developers seek rapid regulatory approval for releasing new 
genetically engineered (“GE”) organisms. 
Experts continue to debate the proper role of risk as the primary 
governance criteria, the role of the precautionary principle, and the 
ethics of intentional eradication of certain species while engaging in 
de-extinction for others.16 This Article argues that, while current 
conservation laws do not directly address many of the specific 
questions that arise with CRISPR, the ESA framework can, and 
should, guide the use of gene editing.17 The ESA affirms the intrinsic 
value of species conservation, prohibits harming or killing members 
of protected species, and provides regulatory tools to help species and 
their habitats recover.18 Using the ESA as a model for CRISPR 
governance would not require a blanket prohibition on the use of 
gene editing when extinction is a possible outcome. There are 
compelling public health and ecological arguments for using the 
technique. For example, the ESA exempts pest insects and invasive 
species,19 and an ESA-based framework for biotechnology 
governance could allow exemptions to achieve public health and 
conservation goals. 
 
weeks”); Antonio Regalado, The Extinction Invention, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 13, 2016), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601213/the-extinction-invention/ [https://perma.cc/5AAQ-
5SJ8] (“[W]ith CRISPR, even a two-person team could, in theory, change an entire 
species.”). 
 16. See, e.g., GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 11, at 10, 78 (“There is 
insufficient evidence available at this time to support the release of gene-drive modified 
organisms into the environment.”); Austin Burt et al., Open Letter: Research on Gene 
Drive Technology Can Benefit Conservation and Public Health, OUTREACH NETWORK 
FOR GENE DRIVE RES. (Nov. 14, 2018), https://genedrivenetwork.org/open-letter 
[https://perma.cc/9L85-6WQ7] (opposing a proposed ban on gene drive research); Richard 
Conniff, Should Genetic Engineering Be Used as a Tool for Conservation?, YALE ENV’T 
360 (July 20, 2017), https://e360.yale.edu/features/should-new-genetic-engineering-be-
used-as-a-conservation-tool [https://perma.cc/L339-FB55] (noting concerns about using 
gene editing for conservation).  
 17. This Article focuses on domestic biotechnology governance, but it is important to 
note that critical gaps also exist at the international level. Laboratories across the globe 
are utilizing the technology and gene-editing developments made in one country that may 
affect many other countries. See generally Noble et al., supra note 10 (describing such 
developments). 
 18. See infra Section II.A. 
 19. See infra note 76 and accompanying text. 
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The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I presents three general 
categories for understanding the interaction between gene editing and 
species viability: population management, conservation, and broader 
ecosystem impacts. Part II provides an overview of the key U.S. 
governance tools that apply to gene editing: the ESA, the 
Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology 
Governance (“Coordinated Framework”), and nonregulatory 
measures that guide research and development. Part III proposes 
steps to incorporate an ESA-based framework into U.S. 
biotechnology governance. The framework would restrict some uses 
of gene editing, but it does not stifle continued research, and it targets 
gene-editing efforts on the most critical public health challenges. 
I.  GENE EDITING AND SPECIES VIABILITY 
The recent advances in gene-editing techniques allow scientists 
to create new organisms, modify existing organisms, and eradicate 
unwanted species. Research is underway to apply these techniques to 
eliminate disease vectors, control invasive species, expand the genetic 
pools for endangered species, help species migrate, and recreate 
extinct species. The range of potential uses for gene editing highlights 
the governance challenges, as each potential use of gene-editing 
techniques raises distinct legal, ecological, and ethical issues. This part 
identifies three broad categories where gene editing and species 
viability intersect: reducing populations via gene editing, utilizing 
gene editing as a tool for conservation, and fostering broad ecosystem 
impacts. 
A. Population Management 
According to the World Health Organization, there were 
approximately 219 million malaria cases and 435,000 malaria deaths 
in 2017.20 Dengue fever is a threat for almost half of the world’s 
population, and “[s]evere dengue is a leading cause of serious illness 
and death among children in some Asian and Latin American 
countries.”21 The same mosquito that transmits dengue can also 
 
 20. Malaria: Key Facts, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Nov. 19, 2018), 
http://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/malaria [https://perma.cc/295A-UKPL]. 
 21. Dengue and Severe Dengue: Key Facts, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Sept. 13, 2018), 
http://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/dengue-and-severe-dengue [https://perma.cc/
XEL3-83L8]. 
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transmit the Zika virus.22 As of 2018, eighty-six countries and 
territories have reported instances of mosquito-transmitted Zika 
infection.23 Malaria is treatable, but the cost of eradication using 
conventional methods is prohibitive.24 Treatments do not currently 
exist for dengue25 or Zika.26 The mosquitos are also increasingly 
resistant to pesticides, complicating population management.27 
Controlling or eliminating disease vectors via CRISPR is the 
focus of much early-stage research and offers perhaps the most 
beneficial use of biotechnology to reduce or eliminate species 
populations.28 Population management via gene editing may take 
different forms. Gene edits may cause sterility in the modified 
organisms, cause the modified organism to produce only male 
offspring, or prevent a modified organism’s offspring from reaching 
sexual maturity.29 Each of these options affect the targeted organisms, 
and perhaps their immediate offspring, but the genetic modifications 
do not spread throughout a population. For example, sterile insect 
techniques that prevent GE organisms or their offspring from 
reproducing depend upon repeated releases of the modified 
organism.30 Such techniques may allow scientists to manage negative 
 
 22. Mosquito Control: Can It Stop Zika at Source?, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
https://www.who.int/emergencies/zika-virus/articles/mosquito-control/en/ [https://perma.cc/
UD3U-LYW5] (last updated Feb. 17, 2019). 
 23. Zika Virus: Key Facts, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (July 20, 2018), 
http://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/zika-virus [https://perma.cc/M6EW-KA49]. 
 24. See Danielle Renwick, Can Malaria Be Eradicated?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. 
(Oct. 5, 2016), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/can-malaria-be-eradicated [https://perma.cc/
ACH3-HS5G] (citing a Gates Foundation estimate that malaria eradication “would cost 
between $90 billion and $120 billion”). 
 25. Dengue and Severe Dengue: Key Facts, supra note 21. 
 26. Zika Virus: Key Facts, supra note 23. 
 27. Zach N. Adelman & Zhijian Tu, Control of Mosquito-Borne Infectious Diseases: 
Sex and Gene Drive, 32 TRENDS PARASITOLOGY 219, 219 (2016). 
 28. GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 11, at 5 (“Some of the fundamental 
reasons to conduct gene drive research include widely shared commitments to fighting 
human disease, promoting human welfare, and protecting and restoring the natural 
environment.”); Andrew Hammond et al., A CRISPR-Cas9 Gene Drive System Targeting 
Female Reproduction in the Malaria Mosquito Vector Anopheles Gambiae, 34 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 78, 78 (2016); see, e.g., Adelman & Tu, supra note 27, at 219 (“Given 
recent breakthroughs in the development of CRISPR-Cas9 reagents as a source of gene 
drive, more advanced technologies .	.	. may represent efficient and self-limiting methods to 
control mosquito populations.”). 
 29. Adelman & Tu, supra note 27, at 219, 222; Nikolay P. Kandul et al., Transforming 
Insect Population Control with Precision Guided Sterile Males with Demonstration in Flies, 
10 NATURE COMM., no. 84, Jan. 8, 2019, at 1, 1.  
 30. Conventional sterile insect techniques rely on radiation to sterilize male pest 
insects. Diamondback Moth Project at Cornell University in 2015, SHELTON LAB (Jun. 17, 
2015), http://shelton.entomology.cornell.edu/2015/06/17/cornell-dbm-project-2015/ 
97 N.C. L. REV. 1329 (2019) 
1336 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97 
long-term impacts.31 If the genetic modification is not effective or 
leads to unanticipated impacts, the next release could be canceled or 
altered. 
Gene drives, by contrast, are genetic alterations intended to 
spread throughout a population of rapidly reproducing organisms 
after the initial release.32 For example, scientists could use a gene 
drive to spread a genetic alteration through populations of Aedes 
aegypti and Aedes albopictus mosquitos (dengue vectors) to prevent 
generations of mosquitos from transmitting the dengue virus.33 Gene 
drives could quickly affect populations far beyond the target area, 
thus magnifying concerns about irreversible impacts.34 Research is 
underway to develop gene drive techniques that are reversible or that 
phase out over time, but these techniques are still in the experimental 
phase.35 
The same gene-editing techniques that could target disease 
vectors may also control agricultural pests and invasive species.36 
Reducing pest insects could prevent billions of dollars in annual 
damage to crops and potentially lead to a dramatic reduction in the 
use of chemical pesticides.37 Billions of dollars are also spent each 
 
[https://perma.cc/8A6K-7VZR]. The sterilized insects are then released to mate with local 
females of the same species, preventing offspring. Id. “[T]his reduces the pest population 
over time with multiple releases.” Id. Replacing radiation with advanced genetic 
engineering allows more precise modifications and thus could be more effective than 
conventional methods. See id. 
 31. See, e.g., Kelly E. Ormond et al., Human Germline Genome Editing, 101 AM. J. 
HUM. ETHICS 167, 169 (2017). 
 32. See, e.g., GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 11, at 149; Douglas W. 
Drury et al., CRISPR/Cas9 Gene Drives in Genetically Variable and Nonrandomly Mating 
Wild Populations, 3 SCI. ADVANCES, no. e1601910, May 19, 2017, at 1, 1 (“Gene drives 
work by segregation distortion or ‘super Mendelian’ inheritance, wherein heterozygous 
individuals either transmit a desired gene in >90% of their gametes instead of the 50% 
Mendelian expectation or are transformed into homozygotes.”); Kyros Kyrou et al., A 
CRISPR–Cas9 Gene Drive Targeting Doublesex Causes Complete Population Suppression 
in Caged Anopheles Gambiae Mosquitoes, 36 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1062, 1062–66 
(2018) (describing a gene drive experiment). 
 33. GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 11, at 50–52.  
 34. Kevin M. Esvelt & Neil J. Gemmell, Conservation Demands Safe Gene Drive, 15 
PLOS BIOLOGY, no. e2003850, Nov. 16, 2017, at 1, 2 (“[Gene] drive systems lack control 
mechanisms and are consequently highly invasive.”); Noble et al., supra note 10, at 1.  
 35. See, e.g., John M. Marshall & Omar S. Akbari, Can CRISPR-Based Gene Drive Be 
Confined in the Wild? A Question for Molecular and Population Biology, 13 ACS 
CHEMICAL BIOLOGY 424, 424 (2018); Kevin M. Esvelt, Daisy Drive Systems, SCULPTING 
EVOLUTION, http://www.sculptingevolution.org/daisydrives [https://perma.cc/327R-FSE2] 
(describing daisy drive systems). 
 36. Raul F. Medina, Gene Drives and the Management of Agricultural Pests, 5 J. 
RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION S255, S256–57 (2017). 
 37. Brooke Borel, When the Pesticides Run Out, 543 NATURE 302, 303–04 (2017). 
97 N.C. L. REV. 1329 (2019) 
2019] GOVERNING EXTINCTION 1337 
year to control invasive species in the United States.38 An interagency 
effort is underway to evaluate the role of biotechnology in invasive 
species management.39 A 2017 Invasive Species Advisory Committee 
report identified the following examples of advanced biotechnology 
applications for managing invasive species: utilizing the sterile insect 
technique to address insects such as a mosquito species endangering 
Hawaiian birds; releasing GE insects that are unable to carry diseases; 
modifying native species to make them more resistant to nonnative 
diseases; and enhancing crops to help them resist insect pests.40 
Gene editing could also target a wide range of insects, plants, and 
animals that are not disease vectors, agricultural pests, or invasive 
species.41 There is a lucrative pest control industry in the United 
States.42 Without regulatory limitations, the same techniques used to 
control harmful organisms could also target pests that are nuisances 
to humans, livestock, or landscaping but do not pose infectious 
disease concerns. This potentially expansive use of gene editing 
highlights the need for deliberate, early, and effective guidance on the 
various potential uses of CRISPR. 
B. Conservation 
The Earth is in the midst of the sixth mass extinction and the first 
that is caused primarily by human activity.43 The rapid pace of climate 
 
 38. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., THE COST OF INVASIVE SPECIES 1 (2012), 
https://www.fws.gov/verobeach/pythonpdf/costofinvasivesfactsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/
M7PU-92YB]; see also R. ELIOT CRAFTON & SAHAR ANGADJIVAND, CONG. RES. SERV., 
IF11011, INVASIVE SPECIES: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 2 (2018). 
 39. Nat’l Invasive Species Council, Technology Innovation, U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR, 
https://www.doi.gov/invasivespecies/technology-innovation [https://perma.cc/5CZD-UMVW]. 
 40. INVASIVE SPECIES ADVISORY COMM., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, 
ADVANCED BIOTECHNOLOGY TOOLS FOR INVASIVE SPECIES MANAGEMENT 1–2 
(2017), https://edit.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/isac_advanced_biotechnology_white_
paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/9522-ZQB7]. 
 41. Jonas J. Monast, Editing Nature: Reconceptualizing Biotechnology Governance, 59 
B.C. L. REV. 2377, 2400 (2018). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Wolfgang Cramer et al., Detection and Attribution of Observed Impacts, in 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY PART A: 
GLOBAL AND SECTORAL ASPECTS 979, 990 (Christopher B. Field et al. eds., 2014), 
https://ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/WGIIAR5-PartA_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/
SWY2-5LK7] (“Across the world, species extinctions are at or above the highest rates of 
species extinction in the fossil record.”); Gerardo Ceballos, Paul R. Ehrlich & Rodolfo 
Dirzo, Biological Annihilation via the Ongoing Sixth Mass Extinction Signaled by 
Vertebrate Population Losses and Declines, 114 PNAS E6089, E6095 (2017); Ian Johnston, 
Humans are Ushering in the Sixth Mass Extinction of Life on Earth, Scientists Warn, 
INDEPENDENT (May 31, 2017, 17:00), https://www.independent.co.uk/environment/mass-
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change will likely exacerbate the pace of extinction by creating 
additional habitat pressures for some threatened species and placing 
many others at risk. Species most at risk are those that have limited 
range, require a unique habitat, and have a low population density.44 
Biotechnology could provide a potential solution for some of 
these conservation challenges. In some instances, changing the 
genetic code of threatened or endangered species may expand 
suitable habitats by changing reactions to temperature or increasing 
resistance to diseases.45 Gene editing may also bolster recovery efforts 
for species that experience a significant drop in population and thus 
have a limited genetic pool.46 
Invasive species management also has implications for 
conservation.47 Nonnative rodents, pigs, snakes, plants, and microbes 
have caused population collapses and forced displacement of native 
species.48 However, the link between invasive species management 
and conservation is not cut and dry. For example, established invasive 
species may replace the ecological function of native species.49 
Climate change will further complicate the distinction between native 




 44. Habiba Gitay et al., Ecosystems and Their Goods and Services, in CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2001: IMPACTS, ADAPTION, AND VULNERABILITY 235, 271 (James J. McCarthy 
et al. eds., 2001), https://ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/03/WGII_TAR_full_report-2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B9VZ-UKAB]. 
 45. Megan A. Supple & Beth Shapiro, Conservation of Biodiversity in the Genomics 
Era, 19 GENOME BIOLOGY, no. 131, Sept. 11, 2018, 1, 9–10. 
 46. Jeff A. Johnson et al., Is There a Future for Genome-Editing Technologies in 
Conservation?, 19 ANIMAL CONSERVATION 97, 98 (2016). For example, scientists are 
exploring the use of CRISPR to make cacao trees more resistant to fungi and viruses. 
Laura Geggel, Can Gene Editing Save the World’s Chocolate?, SCI. AM. (Jan. 5, 2018), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/can-gene-editing-save-the-worlds-chocolate/ 
[https://perma.cc/3L5K-FWJ4]. 
 47. Karl J. Campbell et al., The Next Generation of Rodent Eradications: Innovative 
Technologies and Tools to Improve Species Specificity and Increase Their Feasibility on 
Islands, 185 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 47, 51 (2015) (noting the potential for 
CRISPR-enabled gene drives to control invasive rodents); Antonio Regalado, First Gene 
Drive in Mammals Could Aid Vast New Zealand Eradication Plan, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 
10, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603533/first-gene-drive-in-mammals-could-
aid-vast-new-zealand-eradication-plan/ [https://perma.cc/X463-5K7F].  
 48. Jessica Gurevitch & Dianna K. Padilla, Are Invasive Species a Major Cause of 
Extinctions?, 19 TRENDS ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 470, 470 (2004); see also Invasive 
Species: Endangered Species Program, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/
invasives/endangered-species.html [https://perma.cc/DER3-E2EQ]. 
 49. Medina, supra note 36, at S257. 
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De-extinction is another conservation-focused use for gene-
editing technologies.50 CRISPR allows scientists to alter the DNA of 
living organisms to give their offspring traits of extinct species. For 
example, efforts are underway to alter the DNA of band-tailed 
pigeons to create offspring resembling extinct passenger pigeons.51 
The result is a hybrid species rather than an exact replica of the 
extinct species, and the process raises a host of ethical questions 
regarding the purpose of de-extinction, obligations to reintroduced 
organisms, and implications for species conservation generally.52 As 
Professor Alejandro Camacho notes, reintroducing extinct species 
could bolster ecosystem health by restoring an organism that plays a 
particularly important role in the local ecosystem, or the process 
could hamper conservation efforts by imposing new costs and risks.53 
C. Broader Ecosystem Impacts 
The previous two sections discuss changes targeted at particular 
organisms and locations. Gene editing may also foster broader 
ecosystem impacts since altering individual organisms may also alter 
the ecosystems in which they live.54 Some ecosystem changes may be 
deliberate, such as increasing a species’s resilience to climate 
change.55 Gene editing could also lead to unintentional ecosystem 
impacts, such as allowing new species to outcompete native 
organisms.56 Gene editing could therefore cause invasive species 
 
 50. Alejandro E. Camacho, Going the Way of the Dodo: De-Extinction, Dualisms, and 
Reframing Conservation, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 849, 858 (2015). 
 51. De-Extinction Defined, REVIVE & RESTORE, https://reviverestore.org/passenger-
pigeon-de-extinction/ [https://perma.cc/N763-N5HJ]. 
 52. See Gregory E. Kaebnick & Bruce Jennings, De-extinction and Conservation, 
HASTINGS CTR. REP., July–Aug. 2017, at S2, S3–S4 (discussing the ethical considerations 
presented by de-extinction). 
 53. Camacho, supra note 50, at 856–59; see also Norman C. Ellstrand et al., Got 
Hybridization? A Multidisciplinary Approach for Informing Science Policy, 60 
BIOSCIENCE 384, 385 (2010) (“[H]ybridization with the introduced mallard is the major 
conservation problem facing the endangered Hawaiian duck, and has led to its probable 
extirpation on the islands of Oahu and Hawaii.”). 
 54. James E. DiCarlo et al., Safeguarding CRISPR-Cas9 Gene Drives in Yeast, 33 
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1250, 1250 (2015) (noting that gene drives create the risk that 
“unintended genome editing occurring through the escape of strains from laboratories, 
coupled with the prospect of unanticipated ecological change, demands caution”). 
 55. See, e.g., Rachel A. Levin et al., Engineering Strategies to Decode and Enhance the 
Genomes of Coral Symbionts, 8 FRONTIERS MICROBIOLOGY, no. 1220, June 30, 2017, at 1, 
2. 
 56. GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 11, at 5 (“[U]sing a gene drive to 
suppress a non-native weed population may lead to unexpected consequences, such as the 
loss of habitat for native species or even the establishment of a second, more resilient 
invasive species.”); Kent H. Redford, William Adams & Georgina M. Mace, Synthetic 
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challenges in some areas, even as the technique helps eradicate 
invasive species in others.57 
The extent to which gene drives would have lasting impacts on 
target populations or ecosystems remains unclear. For example, a 
2018 study evaluating the potential ecosystem impacts of eradicating 
the Anopheles gambiae mosquito—one of the primary vectors 
responsible for spreading malaria in Africa—concluded that there are 
no ecosystem functions that are unique to the species.58 According to 
one of the authors of the study, there are traits of the species that 
limit its role in ecosystem viability.59 
These results are encouraging for infectious disease control, but 
they also point to the importance of rigorous analysis for each 
potential use of gene drives. Other mosquito species may play more 
important roles in their respective ecosystems, but U.S. law does not 
limit gene drives to mosquito species that carry critical infectious 
diseases.60 There is a lucrative pest control industry in the United 
States.61 Without regulatory limitations, the temptation may be too 
great to deploy gene drives to manage pests that are nuisances to 
humans, livestock, or landscaping but do not pose infectious disease 
concerns. This result may not be a cause of concern, and may even be 
desirable, but actions where extinction is a likely outcome should not 
be governed by the market alone. Lawmakers should establish 
safeguards requiring rigorous studies of potential impacts, similar to 
the work currently underway to assess the use of gene drives to target 
mosquito-borne diseases.62 Society needs access to information that 
allows informed opinions about the technology and meaningful 
opportunities to influence governance choices. 
 
Biology and Conservation of Nature: Wicked Problems and Wicked Solutions, 11 PLOS 
BIOLOGY, no. e1001530, Apr. 2, 2013, at 1, 2 tbl.1.  
 57. Redford et al., supra note 56, at 2 tbl.1 (noting that genetically modified organisms 
“may promote invasive capabilities (or novel organisms may be invasive)”). 
 58. C. M. Collins et al., Effects of the Removal or Reduction in Density of the Malaria 
Mosquito, Anopheles gambiae s.I., on Interacting Predators and Competitors in Local 
Ecosystems, 33 MED. & VETERINARY ENTOMOLOGY 1, 10–11 (2018). 
 59. Hayley Dunning, Removing Malaria-Carrying Mosquitoes Unlikely to Affect 
Ecosystems, Says Report, IMPERIAL C. LONDON (July 26, 2018), https://www.imperial.ac.uk/
news/187427/removing-malariacarrying-mosquitoes-unlikely-affect-ecosystems/ [https://perma.cc/
9R6M-66NB] (“As adults, An. gambiae mosquitoes are small, hard to catch, most mobile at 
night and not very juicy, so they are not a rewarding prey for both insect and vertebrate 
predators. Many do eat them -- sometimes accidentally -- but there is no evidence that 
they are a big or vital part of the diet of any other animal.”). 
 60. See infra Section II.B. 
 61. Pest Management Industry Fact Sheet, NAT’L PEST MGMT. ASS’N, 
https://npmapestworld.org/newsroom/industry-fact-sheet/ [https://perma.cc/J562-GA7K]. 
 62. See Noble et al., supra note 10, at 2. 
97 N.C. L. REV. 1329 (2019) 
2019] GOVERNING EXTINCTION 1341 
Researchers are utilizing computer models to evaluate the 
likelihood of a gene drive spreading throughout a population.63 
Perhaps predictably at the early stage of CRISPR-enabled gene 
drives, the models are producing conflicting projections. For example, 
recent analysis by leading scientists involved in developing gene drive 
techniques suggests that gene drives released into wild populations 
could quickly spread well beyond the target area.64 Another study 
released around the same time reaches a starkly different conclusion, 
projecting that resistance to the gene drive would “evolve almost 
inevitably in most natural populations” unless there are further 
interventions.65 
The rapid spread of gene drives could be beneficial or harmful 
depending on the goals of the biotechnology efforts. Rapid spread 
could also contribute to disease eradication efforts, for example. 
Alternatively, it could undermine efforts to control invasive species in 
some areas without affecting the target species’s viability. The 
divergent potential outcomes are a fundamental challenge for 
scientists developing gene drive mechanisms and government officials 
considering whether to approve the use of gene drives. The actual 
impacts of a gene drive will not be certain until field trials take place, 
a point at which it may be difficult or impossible to reverse 
unintended results.66 
II.  GOVERNING THE ECOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF GENE EDITING 
Current U.S. law governing biotechnology generally focuses on 
risk to humans and agriculture rather than broader ecosystem 
 
 63. See, e.g., id. (presenting results of a mathematical model exploring the potential 
spread of gene drives); see also Philip A. Eckhoff et al., Impact of Mosquito Gene Drive on 
Malaria Elimination in a Computational Model with Explicit Spatial and Temporal 
Dynamics, 114 PNAS E255, E255 (2017) (presenting results of a “mathematical model to 
simulate .	.	. gene drive approach[es] in a variety of sub-Saharan African settings”).  
 64. Noble et al., supra note 10, at 2. 
 65. Robert L. Unckless, Andrew G. Clark & Philipp W. Messer, Evolution of 
Resistance Against CRISPR/Cas9 Gene Drive, 205 GENETICS 827, 827 (2017). There are 
additional risks beyond the potential for rapid population collapse of the targeted species. 
Gene drives could impact nontargeted organisms via cross-breeding or lateral gene 
transfer. Kenneth A. Oye et al., Regulating Gene Drives, 345 SCIENCE 626, 626–27 (2014). 
Lateral gene transfer refers to “transmission of DNA .	.	. between different genomes.” 
Kara Rogers, Horizontal Gene Transfer, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/science/horizontal-gene-transfer [https://perma.cc/QJ7Q-X726] 
(last updated Nov. 30, 2018). 
 66. See, e.g., Borel & Quanta, supra note 15 (noting that scientists are relying on 
computer modeling to assess gene drive impacts because they “have no experience 
engineering systems that are going to evolve outside of our control”). 
97 N.C. L. REV. 1329 (2019) 
1342 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97 
impacts.67 CRISPR, however, requires a broader approach to address 
the scope of potential uses for the technology.68 The technology is a 
relatively recent breakthrough, and scientists are still discovering its 
expansive possibilities.69 The technology promises profound societal 
benefits, including the disease eradication and conservation efforts 
described in Part I. It also places tremendous power in the hands of 
the scientists working with CRISPR.70 Whether or not the technology 
delivers upon its promise, however, is up in the air. Current laws were 
not designed to address the fundamental questions regarding when 
and how humans should use genetics to redesign ecosystems. 
The uncertainty about CRISPR’s impacts, combined with the 
relatively low cost, simplicity, and precision of the technology, bring 
biotechnology governance questions into sharp relief. For example, 
when is it appropriate to use gene editing to reduce species 
populations or foster extinction? When is de-extinction or species 
enhancement appropriate? What governance standards apply? How 
do distinctions between native versus nonnative or natural versus 
nonnatural apply to gene-edited organisms? What is the proper role 
of government regulation versus nonbinding soft law governance? 
The United States does not have a consistent approach when it 
comes to species preservation and eradication. On the one hand, 
Congress has enacted numerous laws aimed at preventing extinction 
domestically and internationally.71 On the other hand, federal and 
state policies encourage management of disease-carrying insects, 
invasive species, and insects and animals that harm crops and 
 
 67. See infra Section II.B. 
 68. Monast, supra note 41, at 2381–82 (advocating for a broader approach to 
biotechnology governance that balances competing societal values). 
 69. Jennifer Doudna and Emmanuelle Charpentier coauthored a seminal paper in 
2012 about CRISPR and gene editing. For a review of that paper, see generally Martin 
Jinek et al., A Programmable Dual-RNA–Guided DNA Endonuclease in Adaptive 
Bacterial Immunity, 337 SCIENCE 816 (2012). 
 70. See, e.g., Michael Specter, Rewriting the Code of Life, NEW YORKER, Jan. 2, 2017, 
at 34 (quoting MIT professor Kevin Esvelt as telling an audience that “as a single scientist, 
I can alter an organism in a laboratory that will have more of an effect on all your lives 
than anything the [Massachusetts] legislature .	.	. can do”). 
 71. See, e.g., Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §	703(a) (2012); Endangered 
Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §	1531(a)(3) (2012) (recognizing that threatened or endangered 
“species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, 
recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its people”); African Elephant 
Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§	4201–4203 (2012) (supporting elephant conservation 
programs); Wild Exotic Bird Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §	4902 (2012) (restricting 
international trade of exotic birds and encouraging conservation programs); Rhinoceros 
and Tiger Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §	5302 (2012) (supporting conservation of 
rhinoceros and tigers). 
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livestock.72 Although this approach endorses efforts to eradicate 
harmful organisms, it does not endorse species extinction. The laws 
were enacted long before the development of modern gene-editing 
techniques.73 The prospect of widescale impacts and the conflicting 
approaches to species eradication leave federal regulators without 
proper guidance for forthcoming proposals to release gene-edited 
organisms.74 
This part describes two key sources of biotechnology and 
conservation governance: the ESA and the Coordinated Framework. 
Together, this collection of law and implementing regulations create 
the default approach for overseeing the intersection of gene editing 
and species viability in the United States. 
A. Endangered Species Act 
The ESA is the cornerstone of U.S. legal measures to prevent 
extinction and establishes the principle that plant and animal species 
have “esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and 
scientific value to the Nation and its people.”75 With the exception of 
pest insects and invasive species, the statute creates a legal regime to 
protect individual members of a vulnerable species and includes an 
expansive list of prohibited actions involving a member of a protected 
species.76 Private landowners may face restrictions on the use of 
property that is designated as a “critical habitat” for a protected 
species.77 Federal agencies whose actions may impact listed species 
 
 72. See, e.g., Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §	7701 (2012). 
 73. For example, the ESA was first enacted by Congress in 1973. Endangered Species 
Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§	1531–
1544 (2012)). 
 74. See, e.g., INVASIVE SPECIES ADVISORY COMM., supra note 40, at 3 (“[I]nvasive 
species applications represent a divergence from the types of products and private sector 
applicants with which the regulatory agencies have traditionally dealt.”). 
 75. §	1531(a)(3); U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., PROPOSAL TO PERMIT THE FIELD RELEASE 
OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED DIAMONDBACK MOTH IN NEW YORK: 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, JUNE 2017, at 69 (2017) (“[The ESA] is one of the most 
far-reaching wildlife conservation laws ever enacted by any nation.”). 
 76. 16 U.S.C. §	1538(a) (2012) (prohibiting the “tak[ing]” of an endangered species). 
The ESA defines “take” as including the following actions: “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, 
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.” 
Id. §	1532(19); see also id. §	1532(6) (exempting from the definition of “endangered 
species” any “species of the Class Insecta determined by the Secretary to constitute a pest 
whose protection under the provisions of this [Act] would present an overwhelming and 
overriding risk to man”). The law defines “endangered species” as one “in danger of 
extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range.” Id. A “threatened species” 
is “likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or 
a significant portion of its range.” Id. §	1532(20). 
 77. See id. §	1533(a)(3)(A)(i). 
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must consult with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service 
(“FWS”) or National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) to 
determine whether the actions may proceed.78 Violations of the ESA 
may result in civil and criminal penalties.79 
At this stage, it is unclear the extent to which the ESA will 
influence the deployment of gene editing. Some of the uncertainty 
rests with questions about the viability of the ESA itself. The ESA is 
perennially controversial due primarily to land use restrictions 
necessary to protect critical habitats and the costs associated with 
limiting economic activity when a protected species is present.80 To 
date, the ESA has weathered repeated congressional efforts to repeal 
or weaken the law,81 but the Trump administration may succeed in 
restricting the reach of the ESA where past efforts have failed.82 In 
July 2018, the Department of Commerce proposed regulatory 
changes to allow agencies to consider the economic impacts of listing 
a species as threatened or endangered.83 If implemented, the new 
regulations would significantly restrict the reach of the ESA and 
could potentially favor the use of genetic engineering for population 
management if doing so were more cost effective than other 
measures.84 
Challenges to the ESA extend beyond current regulatory 
proposals. The FWS and NMFS consistently face long backlogs of 
 
 78. See id. §	1536(a)(2); see also Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 
1125 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that the NMFS is, along with the FWS, a service that an 
agency may be required to coordinate with under §	1536(a)(2)). 
 79. 16 U.S.C. §	1540(a)–(b) (2012). 
 80. See, e.g., PERVAZE A. SHEIKH ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33309, 
REAUTHORIZATION OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (ESA): A COMPARISON OF 
PENDING BILLS AND A PROPOSED AMENDMENT WITH CURRENT LAW 1 (2006).  
 81. See, e.g., id. at 3–4 (describing three bills introduced in 2006 to amend ESA 
implementation); see also M. LYNNE CORN & KRISTINA ALEXANDER, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R42945, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (ESA) IN THE 113TH CONGRESS: NEW 
AND RECURRING ISSUES 17–18 (2014) (describing proposed amendments to the ESA 
during the 113th Congress). 
 82. Lisa Friedman, Kendra Pierre-Louis & Livia Albeck-Ripka, Law That Saved the 
Bald Eagle Could Be Vastly Reworked, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/19/climate/endangered-species-act-changes.html 
[https://perma.cc/H6UM-RCL5 (dark archive)] (referring to the Trump administration’s 
proposal as “the most sweeping set of changes in decades to the Endangered Species 
Act”). 
 83. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Revision of the Regulations for 
Listing Species and Designating Critical Habitat, 83 Fed. Reg. 35,193, 35,194–95 (proposed 
July 25, 2018) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 424). 
 84. See id.; see also ESA Implementation: Regulation Revisions, U.S. FISH & 
WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/endangered/improving_ESA/regulation-revisions.html 
[https://perma.cc/XX8A-R3SA] (last updated Aug. 14, 2018). 
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species awaiting a listing determination.85 Furthermore, ESA 
protections are not automatic. In order for the ESA to apply, the 
FWS or NMFS must determine whether the species is threatened or 
endangered and, if so, how to respond.86 The agencies have discretion 
when deciding whether listing is appropriate.87 Government officials 
may also conclude that listing is warranted but delay the decision if 
listing would interfere with the agency’s ability to protect other 
priority species.88  
It is not clear how federal agencies will apply this discretion 
when considering a genetically modified organism. The statute does 
not specify how similar genetic codes of protected and modified 
species must be in order for protections to apply to both.89 It does, 
however, allow protections to extend to species that “closely 
resemble[] in appearance, at the point in question, a species which has 
been listed pursuant to such section that enforcement personnel 
would have substantial difficulty in attempting to differentiate 
between the listed and unlisted species.”90 The law also includes 
provisions for protecting “experimental populations,” such as a 
species that has recovered via captive breeding and is subsequently 
released into the wild.91 
Other questions about the ESA’s application to GE organisms 
arise because Congress implemented the ESA before the recent 
advances in biotechnology and thus did not contemplate the use of 
genetic engineering to drive species to extinction. First, the law does 
not apply prospectively. The listing process only becomes an option 
after the population collapse is underway.92 Deliberate steps to 
initiate population collapse via a gene drive, therefore, would not 
trigger ESA protections until the gene drive spread throughout a 
population. 
Second, the law presumes that extinction is gradual, allowing 
federal regulators time to engage in a lengthy regulatory process of 
 
 85. Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the U.S. 
Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277, 280–81 (1993). 
 86. 16 U.S.C. §	1533(a)–(b) (2012). 
 87. Id. §	1533(a)(2)(A)–(C) (noting the agency discretion in the listing process). 
 88. See id. §	1533(b)(3)(B)(iii); see also 50 C.F.R. §§	424.14(a)–(b), (c)(3), 424.10 
(2018) (“The Secretary may .	.	. change the listed status of a species .	.	.	.”). 
 89. See Norman F. Carlin, Ilan Wurman & Tamara Zakim, How to Permit Your 
Mammoth: Some Legal Implications of “De-Extinction,” 33 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 22 
(2013). 
 90. 16 U.S.C. §	1533(e)(A) (2012). 
 91. 50 C.F.R. §	17.81(a) (2018). 
 92. See 16 U.S.C. §	1533(a)(1)–(2) (2012) (listing factors for determining whether a 
species is threatened or endangered). 
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studying the threats to the species, formally listing the species as 
threatened or endangered, and implementing protections.93 Gene 
drives could initiate rapid population collapses before the completion 
of the listing process. Not only would the ESA fail to prohibit the 
initial release of the gene drive, but federal officials may also be 
unable to respond, even if they are able to complete the listing 
process, if the threat to the species is a genetic trait explicitly designed 
to spread through the population.94 
Third, the ESA presumes that habitat is static and that protected 
habitat should focus on a species’s native range.95 Habitat loss is the 
dominant threat for many vulnerable species,96 and the problem will 
only get worse as the impacts of climate change take root. Some flora 
and fauna will migrate as temperatures rise.97 Species that are unable 
to migrate, or that depend on a particular type of habitat that is no 
longer available, will perish unless there are new interventions.98 Even 
in the absence of gene editing, dynamic habitat changes will 
exacerbate regulatory and political pressures on ESA habitat 
protections.99 Genetically altering species could exacerbate the legal, 
ecological, and social challenges if the changes help a species migrate. 
B. The Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology 
Due to the limited reach of the ESA, federal regulators depend 
on existing statutes focused on human health, pest management, and 
environmental impacts to address the intersection of conservation 
 
 93. Id. §	1533(b)(1)(A) (“The Secretary shall make [listing] determinations .	.	. solely 
on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data available to him after conducting a 
review of the status of the species and after taking into account those efforts, if any, being 
made by any State or foreign nation, or any political subdivision of a State or foreign 
nation, to protect such species, whether by predator control, protection of habitat and 
food supply, or other conservation practices, within any area under its jurisdiction; or on 
the high seas.”). 
 94. Monast, supra note 41, at 2409; see also Noble et al., supra note 10, at 2 (discussing 
the likelihood that gene drives would spread wild populations). 
 95. Camacho, supra note 50, at 870–71, 885. The native versus nonnative distinction 
frequently appears in wildlife management laws. Id. at 892. 
 96. Patrick Parenteau, Rearranging the Deck Chairs: Endangered Species Act Reforms 
in an Era of Mass Extinction, 22 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 227, 233 (1998).  
 97. Craig Welch, Half of All Species Are on the Move—And We’re Feeling It, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC (Apr. 27, 2017), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/04/climate-change-
species-migration-disease/ [https://perma.cc/B9WD-X4LC]; see also Ben A. Minteer & 
James P. Collins, Move It or Lose It? The Ecological Ethics of Relocating Species Under 
Climate Change, 20 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 1801, 1801 (2010). 
 98. J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to 
the No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1, 23–24 (2008). 
 99. See id. at 27–29.  
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and gene editing. The Coordinated Framework divides primary 
jurisdiction over nonhuman uses of biotechnology among three 
agencies: the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), the United 
States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”), and the Environmental 
Protection Agency (“EPA”).100 The FDA regulates animal drugs and 
foods derived from plants and oversees genetic engineering aimed at 
controlling infectious diseases.101 The USDA’s jurisdiction centers on 
animal and plant pests.102 GE animals are subject to USDA regulation 
if they present a risk to livestock health.103 GE insects may also be 
subject to USDA oversight if there is a risk the insects could spread 
livestock diseases, affect crops, or spread noxious weeds.104 The 
EPA’s role in biotechnology governance focuses primarily on 
pesticides and toxic materials.105 
The Coordinated Framework does not provide a comprehensive 
system for responding to potential ecological impacts of GE 
organisms.106 Because the primary statutes informing biotechnology 
governance do not directly address ecological considerations, the 
agencies rely primarily on the National Environmental Policy Act 
(“NEPA”) to assess the environmental impacts of major federal 
actions.107 NEPA serves an important function by requiring entities to 
 
 100. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302, 
23,302 (June 26, 1986); OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. POL’Y, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, MODERNIZING THE REGULATORY SYSTEM FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY 
PRODUCTS: FINAL VERSION OF THE 2017 UPDATE TO THE COORDINATED FRAMEWORK 
FOR THE REGULATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 1 (2017), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/2017_coordinated_framework_update.pdf [https://perma.cc/
B5W3-6WWY]. 
 101. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§	343(s)(2)(C), 360(b) 
(2012); The Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §	262(a), (i)(1) (2012 & Supp. 2017); 
OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. POL’Y, supra note 100, at 9, tbl.1. 
 102. See The Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §	7701(2) (2012); The Animal Health 
Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§	8302(14), 8304 (2012 & Supp. 2017). Other statutes granting 
the USDA jurisdiction over aspects of genetic engineering include the Federal Meat 
Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §	601(a) (2012) (defining secretary); id. §	602, and the Poultry 
Products Inspection Act, id. §	451. 
 103. See 7 U.S.C. §	8303 (2012). 
 104. Id. §§	8302–8303, 8305 (2012 & Supp. 2017) (animal health protection); see also id. 
§	7701 (2012) (finding the “detection, control, eradication” and prevention of the “spread 
of plant pests or noxious weeds is necessary for the protection of the agriculture, 
environment, and economy of the United States”). 
 105. See The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §	136a 
(2012); The Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§	2601–2629 (2012 & Supp. 2017). 
 106. Monast, supra note 41, at 2389–91, 2411. 
 107. See The National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §	4332(C) (2012); OFFICE 
OF SCI. & TECH. POL’Y, supra note 100, at 21−22 (stating that both the USDA and FDA 
still comply with NEPA requirements when they are applicable). NEPA only applies when 
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collect data, evaluate potential environmental impacts, and provide 
the public with an opportunity to submit comments prior to issuing a 
final decision.108 The uncertainty presented by gene editing is 
precisely the type of question that calls for the thorough investigation 
required by NEPA. The statute, however, is procedural.109 Agencies 
must evaluate the potential environmental impacts and justify why 
they choose a particular course of action, but NEPA does not require 
agencies to choose a particular course of action based on the 
environmental impacts identified by the analysis.110 
In 2016, the FDA and USDA each approved field trials for GE 
insects designed to manage local populations.111 The FDA considered 
the release of genetically modified Aedes aegypti mosquitoes—the 
subspecies that carry Zika and dengue—on the island of Key Haven, 
Florida.112 The USDA considered the release of a genetically 
modified diamondback gypsy moth—a species that creates billion-
dollar damages to crops—at a test site in New York.113 In both 
instances, the genetic modification causes offspring of modified male 
insects to die before reaching sexual maturity.114 This biological 
containment distinguishes the modified mosquitoes and moths at 
 
a “major Federal action[]” has the potential to “significantly” impact the environment. 42 
U.S.C. §	4332(C)(i)–(v) (2012). 
 108. See OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. POL’Y, supra note 100, at 22−23; see also Victor B. 
Flatt, The “Worst Case” May Be the Best: Rethinking NEPA Law to Avoid Future 
Environmental Disasters, 6 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 25, 32–36 (2011) (describing 
the requirements of an environmental impact study under NEPA). 
 109. See 42 U.S.C. §	4332(C); Flatt, supra note 108, at 32. 
 110. 42 U.S.C. §	4332(C). 
 111. See FDA, FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT (FONSI) IN SUPPORT OF A 
PROPOSED FIELD TRIAL OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED (GE) MALE AEDES AEGYPTI 
MOSQUITOES OF THE LINE OX513A IN KEY HAVEN, MONROE COUNTY, FLORIDA 
UNDER AN INVESTIGATIONAL NEW ANIMAL DRUG EXEMPTION 8 (2016) [hereinafter 
FDA FONSI], https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AnimalVeterinary/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/
GeneticEngineering/GeneticallyEngineeredAnimals/UCM514699.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9DT-
Q7Z6]; U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., PROPOSAL TO PERMIT THE FIELD RELEASE OF 
GENETICALLY-ENGINEERED DIAMONDBACK MOTH IN NEW YORK: ENVIRONMENTAL 
ASSESSMENT, DECEMBER 2016, at 1 (2016) [hereinafter DIAMONDBACK MOTH 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT], https://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/aphisdocs/16_076101r_pea.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4K9L-C2W5]. 
 112. FDA, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR INVESTIGATIONAL USE OF AEDES 




 113. DIAMONDBACK MOTH ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 111, at 10. 
 114. See id. at 64; FDA MOSQUITO ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 112, at 
21–22. 
97 N.C. L. REV. 1329 (2019) 
2019] GOVERNING EXTINCTION 1349 
issue from gene drives designed to spread through multiple 
generations. 
The respective agencies conducted environmental assessments 
(“EAs”) as required by NEPA. The EAs were limited to the impacts 
of the field trials themselves rather than the broader implications if 
the insects were eventually approved for commercial release.115 In 
each instance, the agency concluded that there likely were no 
significant environmental impacts that would result from the trials, 
and thus in-depth environmental impact statements were 
unnecessary.116 The conclusion that the release would not have a 
significant impact rested on comparisons between the release of the 
genetically modified insects and the use of conventional chemical 
pesticides to control the insects, the geographic containment of the 
modified insects, and the biological containment built into the trial 
since the modified insects die without passing on the genetic 
modifications to other members of the species.117 Because the trials 
did not include gene drives, the agencies considering the proposed 
field trials did not have to consider the prospect of uncontrolled 
spread beyond the initial generation of released GE insects. 
Both agencies identified endangered species and habitats that the 
GE organism could potentially impact.118 The FDA concluded that 
there would be minimal interaction and that genetic modifications 
would not create a risk of harm from ingestion.119 The USDA 
concluded that no endangered species were located near the test site; 
that prevailing winds would not allow the modified insects to travel to 
areas with endangered plants that may suffer harm from the moths; 
 
 115. DIAMONDBACK MOTH ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 111, at 65 
(“[A]t the conclusion of the experimental release, the release site will be treated with a 
pesticide” to “eliminate any remaining diamondback moths.”); FDA, FDA RELEASES 
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR GENETICALLY ENGINEERED MOSQUITO, 
AUGUST 5, 2016 UPDATE (2016), https://www.fda.gov/animalveterinary/newsevents/
cvmupdates/ucm490246.htm [https://perma.cc/XL9D-5JSJ] (“FDA’s finalization of the EA 
and FONSI does not mean that Oxitec’s GE mosquitoes are approved for commercial 
use.”). 
 116. DIAMONDBACK MOTH ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 111, at 11; 
FDA FONSI, supra note 111, at 85. 
 117. DIAMONDBACK MOTH ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 111, at 64 
(“[The] sterile insect technology in the GE diamondback moth strain .	.	. mitigates many of 
the possible theoretical hazards and risks associated with insect genetic engineering.”); 
FDA FONSI, supra note 111, at 8 (finding that after studying “[t]he consequences of 
escape, survival, and establishment” the proposed field study “is not expected to cause any 
significant adverse impacts on the environment”). 
 118. DIAMONDBACK MOTH ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 111, at 57–64; 
FDA MOSQUITO ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 112, at 45–46, 91.  
 119. FDA FONSI, supra note 111, at 6–7. 
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and, even if the insects did spread, the effects would not be different 
from the nonmodified diamondback moths that already exist across 
the country.120 The agency also determined that releasing the moths 
may lead to environmental benefits by reducing the amount of 
insecticides applied during the growing season.121 Harm to species 
that prey on the insects was unlikely because the populations would 
otherwise be controlled with pesticides and the preying species 
consume other insects.122 
The EAs for the GE moth and mosquito field trials considered 
circumstances with a high level of confidence in geographic and 
biological containment measures. Similar approaches for NEPA 
analysis may not work in the gene drive context or when agencies 
consider proposals for releasing multiple GE organisms in the same 
ecosystems. Comparing the release of genetically modified organisms 
with conventional pest management strategies, for example, will be 
incomplete when the risks of spreading gene drives are unknown or 
there are greater interactions between GE organisms. The focus on 
listed or proposed endangered species may be insufficient in some 
cases if the release of the gene drive could result in population 
collapses in nonlisted species. Limiting the scope of an EA to 
consider only field trials, as opposed to national or international 
impacts, may also be insufficient if gene drives could potentially 
spread to nontarget populations. NEPA requires consideration of 
worst-case scenarios and thus allows agencies to conduct more 
expansive analyses for field trials, but agencies have discretion to 
determine which scenarios to consider.123 
C. Nonregulatory Governance 
The limitations of the ESA and the statutes forming the basis of 
the Coordinated Framework leave many of the crucial decisions 
regarding the intersection of gene editing and species viability to 
nonregulatory forms of governance such as standards, codes of 
 
 120. DIAMONDBACK MOTH ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 111, at 65–67. 
 121. Id. at 58. 
 122. Id. at 57–58. 
 123. Flatt, supra note 108, at 32–33; Richard Lazarus, The National Environmental 
Policy Act in the U.S. Supreme Court: A Reappraisal and a Peek Behind the Curtains, 100 
GEO. L.J. 1507, 1519 (2012) (“[A]gencies can seek to avoid preparing an EIS by agreeing 
to mitigate environmental impacts as necessary to reduce the impact of the proposed 
action below the ‘significant’ threshold.”); see also COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, EXEC. 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: A STUDY 
OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, 19–20 (1997), https://ceq.doe.gov/
docs/ceq-publications/nepa25fn.pdf [https://perma.cc/XSL9-FT23]. 
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conduct, and guidelines.124 Scientists may develop their own ethical 
codes.125 Government agencies and foundations funding research may 
impose their own requirements.126 Universities and other research 
institutions appoint committees to oversee research on human and 
animal subjects.127 Research projects may create their own standards, 
such as the international Target Malaria project that established its 
own ethics advisory committee, research transparency requirements, 
and stakeholder engagement strategies.128 
A growing body of scholarship points to these “soft law” 
mechanisms as critical components of a governance system for 
emerging technologies.129 Rigid restrictions on research and 
experimentation may hamper scientists’ ability to explore new 
technologies that could have profound social impacts.130 Soft law 
measures provide oversight for research and development phases. 
Because they are not regulatory, they can evolve more quickly than 
formal regulation, particularly where existing statutes do not 
adequately address issues presented by the new technology.131 
Nonbinding governance measures already guide gene-editing 
research, including species management and de-extinction, and others 
are proposed by academics and stakeholders.132 
 
 124. See, e.g., GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 11, at 148 (identifying three 
types of governance for gene drives: self-governance by scientists involved in the research, 
formal regulation by national or state authorities, and a “middle ground in which 
governments create guidelines that shape the behavior of scientists and research 
institutions by creating norms and expectations of good practice”). 
 125. Id. at 148, tbl.8-1. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See, e.g., Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee, UNC: RESEARCH, 
https://research.unc.edu/iacuc/ [https://perma.cc/63VN-N6GP]; Introduction to Human 
Research Subject Protection, UNC: RESEARCH, https://research.unc.edu/human-research-
ethics/introduction-human-research-subject-protection-unc/ [https://perma.cc/X3J7-ZXUQ] 
(noting that the University of North Carolina has institutional review boards that review 
each research study project). 
 128. Ethics Advisory Committee, TARGET MALARIA, https://targetmalaria.org/ethics-
advisory-committee/ [https://perma.cc/8Y5V-DXM2]. 
 129. GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 11, at 167; see also Timothy F. 
Malloy, Soft Law and Nanotechnology: A Functional Perspective, 52 JURIMETRICS 347, 
349 (2012); Ana Nordberg et al., Cutting Edges and Weaving Threads in the Gene Editing 
(R)evolution: Reconciling Scientific Progress with Legal, Ethical, and Social Concerns, 5 
J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 35, 82 (2018) (noting the “important role” of soft law mechanisms). 
 130. See, e.g., Mandel & Marchant, supra note 12, at 158–59. Genetically modified 
organisms may also pose significant risks to public health and ecosystems. Id. at 159. 
 131. Id. at 158–59. 
 132. GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 11, at 7–8; Claudia Emerson et al., 
Principles for Gene Drive Research, 358 SCIENCE 1135, 1135–36 (2017); INT’L UNION FOR 
CONSERVATION OF NATURE, IUCN SSC GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON CREATING PROXIES 
OF EXTINCT SPECIES FOR CONSERVATION BENEFIT 10–12 (2016), 
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While soft law measures are crucial components to a governance 
system, they are not well suited for questions regarding voluntary 
extinction or de-extinction and do not replace the need for 
democratic decisionmaking to determine the proper balance between 
public health, environmental, and economic considerations. The 
technical experts who develop and oversee professional standards and 
guidelines may prioritize risk management and safety over 
conservation goals and other societal values.133 Stakeholder 
engagement, while increasingly recognized as an important element in 
technology governance, may not be a priority or may not be feasible 
due to limited resources.134 
Furthermore, disagreement among scientists regarding the 
proper use of gene editing highlights the problems with relying on soft 
law to fill in where regulation does not provide clear signals regarding 
value choices and acceptable levels of risk. Thus far, key figures in the 
development of CRISPR and the use of CRISPR to facilitate gene 
drives have called for major limitations on the use of techniques soon 
after publishing papers describing the techniques.135 Scholars debate 
these proposals in academic journals. In the meantime, experiments 
with CRISPR and gene drives continue unabated. 
III.  ALIGNING BIOTECHNOLOGY AND CONSERVATION 
GOVERNANCE: A PROPOSAL 
The prospect of voluntary extinction, combined with the pace 
and scale of CRISPR developments, calls for a consistent set of 
standards to guide formal regulatory activity as well as the range of 
soft law measures that guide the trajectory of gene-editing research. 
Although the ESA and other conservation statutes may not be 
directly applicable, they are a compelling indication of societal values. 
Biotechnology governance should incorporate reasonable 
 
https://portals.iucn.org/library/sites/library/files/documents/Rep-2016-009.pdf [https://perma.cc/
R7JE-FCGD]; Douglas J. McCauley et al., A Mammoth Undertaking: Harnessing Insight 
from Functional Ecology to Shape De-Extinction Priority Setting, 31 FUNCTIONAL 
ECOLOGY 1003, 1003 (2016) (proposing that de-extinction efforts “(i) select target species 
from guilds with low functional redundancy; (ii) concentrate on species that went extinct 
recently rather than older extinctions; and (iii) only work with species that can be restored 
to levels of abundance that meaningfully restore ecological function”).  
 133. Monast, supra note 41, at 2381–82. 
 134. Natalie Kofler et al., Editing Nature: Local Roots of Global Governance, 362 
SCIENCE 527, 527, 529 (2018) (stating that community engagement is “largely missing” 
from the process of gene-editing research and development). 
 135. Esvelt et al., supra note 6, at 1; see also David Baltimore et al., A Prudent Path 
Forward for Genomic Engineering and Germline Gene Modification, 348 SCIENCE 36, 36 
(2015); Oye et al., supra note 65, at 626. 
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presumptions about the appropriate use of new technologies based on 
conservation efforts already in place. 
The ESA, in particular, is an enduring policy statement about the 
intrinsic value of species and the importance of conservation. The 
principles that form the foundation of the ESA can, and should, guide 
the use of gene editing. Boiling the ESA down to its core elements, 
the law recognizes that humans generally have an obligation to 
prevent extinction, that protecting threatened species requires 
protecting individual members of species, and that federal agencies 
must avoid exacerbating threats to endangered species.136 This 
structure—creating broad protections for threatened or endangered 
species, exempting certain species, and providing limited exemptions 
for activity that may harm protected species—provides a template for 
aligning biotechnology and conservation. Incorporating these 
elements into gene-editing governance would provide clear policy 
guidance regarding acceptable uses of gene editing. 
The remainder of this Article recommends three revisions to 
biotechnology governance as an initial step to align gene-editing 
research and conservation goals. The first two recommendations 
apply the ESA framework to biotechnology governance generally: (1) 
federal agencies should indicate that they will not generally allow the 
release of GE organisms that could threaten species viability; and (2) 
the agencies should allow for exemptions to the general ban and 
specify criteria for qualifying for exemptions. The third 
recommendation identifies initial updates to ESA regulations to 
clarify how the statute applies to genetically modified organisms. 
A. Establish a Presumption Against Release of Genetically Modified 
Organisms that Could Foster Species Extinction 
As a threshold matter, federal agencies should establish a 
presumption against releasing modified organisms that present a risk 
of extinction for the target species or other nontarget species. This 
step would provide clarity for regulators, researchers, and investors. 
This step would also inform soft law governance measures. 
Implementation could take different forms, some of which could 
occur via existing statutory authority and some of which would 
require new legislation. One option includes directing the Council on 
Environmental Quality, or the lead permitting agency, to revise 
NEPA procedures to specify that agencies should reject proposed 
releases of GE organisms if the NEPA process identifies a reasonable 
 
 136. See supra notes 75–91 and accompanying text. 
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risk to species viability, including to nontarget species.137 While such a 
step would place limits on some near-term applications of gene 
editing, extinction and the potential for major irreversible ecological 
impacts are the quintessential examples where clear guidance is 
important. This move would not bar future developments that would 
either achieve desired outcomes without threatening species viability 
or fall within a specified exemption. Revised NEPA guidelines could 
also require agencies to specify, in a transparent manner, the 
acceptable and unacceptable levels of potential risk to the ecosystem 
and nontarget species. Finally, NEPA revisions could also focus gene-
editing research efforts on nonlethal strategies, such as targeting a 
virus rather than its carrier or gene drive techniques that phase out 
over generations.138 
Federal agencies funding gene-editing research should also 
implement the presumption against extinction in their funding 
guidelines. Guidelines from the National Institutes of Health 
(“NIH”), for example, establish safety practices and containment 
procedures to protect researchers, the public, and the environment. 
The NIH Guidelines only apply to government funding and thus do 
not apply to research funded solely via private investment.139 The 
Guidelines also focus solely on laboratory research and do not 
address prospective release of GE organisms into the environment.140 
The NIH Guidelines have a broad reach nonetheless.141 Institutions 
receiving, or hoping to receive, NIH funding may require all 
researchers to comply with the guidelines, not just those that may 
qualify for the federal funding.142 
 
 137. The Council on Environmental Quality “oversees NEPA implementation, 
principally through issuing guidance and interpreting regulations that implement NEPA's 
procedural requirements” and “reviews and approves Federal agency NEPA procedures, 
approves alternative arrangements for compliance with NEPA for emergencies, [and] 
helps to resolve disputes between Federal agencies and with other governmental entities 
and members of the public .	.	.	.” Council on Environmental Quality, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/ceq/ [https://perma.cc/M2UC-DCC9]. 
 138. See Yuemei Dong et al., CRISPR/Cas9-Mediated Gene Knockout of Anopheles 
Gambiae FREP1 Suppresses Malaria Parasite Infection, 14 PLOS PATHOGENS, no. 
e1006898, Mar. 8, 2018, at 1, 1; Marshall & Akbari, supra note 35, at 425–28 (discussing 
strategies to control gene drives after release). 
 139. Mandel & Marchant, supra note 12, at 192. 
 140. Id. at 193. 
 141. Jeffery D. Wolt, Safety, Security, and Policy Considerations for Plant Genome 
Editing, in 149 PROGRESS MOLECULAR BIOLOGY & TRANSLATIONAL SCI. 215, 232 
(2017). 
 142. See David Rainer & Susan Cook, Overcoming Regulatory Gaps in Biological 
Materials Oversight by Enhancing IBC Protocol Review, in ENSURING NATIONAL 
BIOSECURITY 73, 86 (Carole R. Baskin & Alan P. Zelicoff eds., 2016); see also UNC 
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Federal funding and research guidance need not ban funding 
recipients from laboratory-scale research that could impact species 
viability. Such research may be necessary to develop new techniques 
that address social needs without eradicating species, techniques that 
can accomplish goals such as the eradication of malaria by modifying 
mosquitos so they cannot serve as a vector.143 Guidance and funding 
restrictions could, however, prioritize strategies that do not rely on 
species eradication and potentially provide guidance on the release of 
genetically modified organisms developed through the use of federal 
funding. 
B. Allow Exemptions for Specific Public Health and Environmental 
Goals 
The presumption against the release of GE organisms that could 
trigger extinction need not be absolute. There are compelling health 
and governance justifications for utilizing CRISPR to control 
infectious diseases, particularly when conventional control strategies 
are ineffective or prohibitively expensive (e.g., malaria or Zika 
virus).144 
In addition to health benefits, the focus on a small number of 
vectors of severe infectious diseases could serve as a testing ground 
for gene-editing techniques, allowing researchers to gather 
information on the implications of population management and 
species conservation via gene editing. Allowing limited uses of gene 
editing would not restrict laboratory-scale experiments, thus striking a 
balance between precaution and technology development. It would 
also allow opportunities for regulators and stakeholders to develop 
informed opinions about gene editing as information becomes 
available. Information from the early stage uses of gene editing could 
then guide regulatory decisions and stakeholder engagement 
involving other potential releases of GE organisms. 
Other exemptions could also apply when species eradication is 
the goal. In the context of invasive rodents endangering the viability 
 
DEP’T OF ENV’T, HEALTH & SAFETY, NIH GUIDELINES FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING 
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 143. Dong et al., supra note 138, at 1–3. 
 144. See, e.g., Antonio Regalado, Bill Gates Doubles His Bet on Wiping Out 
Mosquitoes with Gene Editing, MIT TECH. REV. (Sept. 6, 2016), 
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of island bird populations, for example, the only viable option may be 
removing, as opposed to controlling, the rodent populations.145 This 
type of exemption is potentially expansive and could include a wide 
range of agricultural pests. Specific criteria for the exemption would 
be necessary to ensure that the exception does not undermine efforts 
to impose meaningful limits on the use of biotechnology to eradicate 
species. 
C. Clarify the ESA’s Application to Genetically Modified Organisms 
The first two recommendations provide guidance for gene-
editing research, but they do not clarify broader questions regarding 
the ESA’s applicability to genetically modified organisms. As noted 
above, addressing GE organisms is not the only area where the ESA 
needs to evolve to remain effective in a world with changing climates 
and migrating species. A detailed set of recommendations to prepare 
the ESA for current and emerging challenges is beyond the scope of 
this Article.146 Instead, the remainder of this Article recommends 
initial steps that could occur via administrative rulemaking or 
legislation to align the ESA with the recent advancements in genomic 
sciences. 
First, policymakers could resolve uncertainty regarding the 
ESA’s reach over gene-edited organisms by clarifying that the 
definition of species includes GE organisms. The statute provides 
only a general definition of the term “species” that is broad enough to 
include species with genetic codes altered by humans.147 Extending 
ESA protections to GE organisms could be particularly important if 
the purpose of the genetic modification is to preserve an existing 
species or reestablish viable populations of extinct species. Otherwise 
the genetic intervention could create the ironic effect of preventing 
the modified organism from qualifying for ESA protections. 
Second, policymakers could adapt a 1996 proposed rule on 
hybrid species—species resulting from cross-breeding between 
protected and unprotected species in the wild or in captivity—to 
 
 145. McGrath, supra note 4; see also Gurevitch & Padilla, supra note 48, at 470. 
 146. Other scholars have offered detailed recommendations for updating conservation 
statutes. See, e.g., Camacho, supra note 50, at 897–902 (proposing a “risk-based adaptive 
ecosystem management” approach to address de-extinction); Ruhl, supra note 98, at 60–62 
(recommending certain FWS steps to help threatened and endangered species survive 
threats posed by climate change). 
 147. See 16 U.S.C. §	1532(16) (2012) (defining “species” to include “any subspecies of 
fish or wildlife or plants, and any distinct population segment of any species of vertebrate 
fish or wildlife which interbreeds when mature”). 
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address GE organisms. The proposed rule would have protected 
hybrid species that more closely resemble a protected species than a 
hybrid of a protected and an unprotected species.148 The proposed 
rule did not protect cross-breeding in captivity or “the artificial 
transfer of genetic material from one taxonomic species into another 
(i.e., transgenics),” but it did make an exception for captive breeding 
conducted pursuant to an approved recovery plan.149 The agencies 
never finalized a rule addressing hybridization, relying instead on 
case-by-case determinations.150 
Applying the proposed hybrid species rule to GE organisms 
would strike a compromise that extends ESA protections to gene 
editing intended to support recovery efforts while excluding other GE 
organisms created in laboratories and those targeting species that are 
not listed as endangered or threatened. The approach could leave 
important gaps, particularly if recovery efforts are not first approved 
by the FWS or NMFS. It would, however, provide a pathway for 
conservation-focused gene editing, and the agencies could update the 
approach as biotechnology matures. 
CONCLUSION 
CRISPR may add to a suite of tools for conservation on the one 
hand and species eradication on the other. It may also change the 
equation on extinction itself, allowing scientists to reverse extinction 
in some circumstances and deliberately foster extinction in others. 
Gene editing, therefore, raises important questions for conservation 
and natural resource management. U.S. law does not currently 
address these questions and the gaps in U.S. regulation of 
biotechnology and endangered species leave regulators and 
researchers without clear policy guidance regarding acceptable uses 
of gene editing. Without updates that address the overlap between 
biotechnology and conservation governance, regulation will evolve 
based on case-by-case applications of existing laws that were not 
designed to address the biotechnology-conservation nexus. 
Regulators and researchers have an opportunity to incorporate 
conservation goals into biotechnology governance, particularly while 
 
 148. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposed Policy and Proposed 
Rule on the Treatment of lntercrosses and Intercross Progeny (the Issue of 
“Hybridization”); Request for Public Comment, 61 Fed. Reg. 4710, 4710–11 (proposed 
Feb. 7, 1996) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 424).  
 149. Id. at 4712. 
 150. John A. Erwin, Hybridizing Law: A Policy for Hybridization Under the 
Endangered Species Act, 47 ENVTL. L. REP. 10615, 10615 (2017). 
97 N.C. L. REV. 1329 (2019) 
1358 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97 
much CRISPR-related research remains at an early stage. The 
proposal outlined in this Article strikes a balance between scientific 
research, societal benefits, and a precautionary approach for genetic 
techniques that are still in developmental stages. It also recognizes 
that questions about species viability do not start with a blank slate. 
Society has made important value choices regarding species 
conservation that provide the foundation of the ESA and other 
conservation statutes. Gene-editing governance should incorporate 
these value choices to ensure that any gene-editing efforts deliver 
societal benefits without undermining conservation goals. 
 
